

^{MR}From My Bookshelf

U.S. Army Chief of Staff (CSA), General Peter J. Schoomaker, has released an extensive reading list to help military professionals further develop confidence, military knowledge, habits of reflection, and intellectual growth, whether they are officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The following synopses are adapted from those found in the CSA's Field-Grade Officers, CW4-CW5, Senior NCOs, and Senior Leaders above Brigade professional reading lists available on-line at <www.army.mil/cmh-pg/reference/CSAList/list1.htm>, accessed 13 December 2004.

Field-Grade Officers, CW4-CW5, Senior NCOs

***National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 17 September 2002, 31 pages**, (available at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>). The aim of this strategy is to help make the world safer and better, with the goal of political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other nations, and respect for human dignity.

***National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, The White House, Washington, D.C., GPO, February 2003, 30 pages**, (available at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf>). The aim of this strategy is to establish a new international norm regarding terrorism that requires nonsupport, nontolerance, and active opposition to terrorists.

***Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Rohan Gunaratna, Berkley Publishing Group, New York, 2003, 304 pages, \$14.00**. Based on over 5 years of research, *Inside al Qaeda* is the definitive story behind the rise of this small, mysterious group to become the notorious organization making headlines today. The book is essential reading for senior officers and NCOs in the Global War on Terrorism.

***Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, James M. McPherson, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, 944 pages, \$18.95**. *Battle Cry of Freedom* is James M. McPherson's brilliant account of the war that made the country what it is today—the American Civil War. In clear, incisive detail, he discusses the causes of the war, military operations, soldiers, and leaders, as well as the political, economic, and social aspects of life in the Union and the Confederacy before and during the war. Numerous historians have pronounced *Battle Cry of Freedom* the best one-volume book on the Civil War ever written. The book is essential reading for senior officers and NCOs wanting to understand this important conflict.

***Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, Martin Van Creveld, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, 295 pages, \$29.99**. In his survey of four centuries of military history, noted historian Martin Van Creveld points out clearly the reasons “amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics.” Most battlefield results would not have been possible without the careful organization and allocation of logistical resources. Field-grade officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs who fail to consider logistics in their plans and operations do so at their peril.

***George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century*, Mark A. Stoler, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1989, 252 pages, \$22.00**. General George C. Marshall played a pivotal role in U.S. history between 1939 and 1951. In this fascinating book, Mark A. Stoler integrates an extensive variety of primary and secondary sources, including Marshall's private papers, in the story of the frustrations and successes of Marshall's attempts to forge a workable military policy during World War II consistent with the basic principles of U.S. democracy. Best remembered for the Marshall Plan, Marshall is made comprehensible as a strategist at the center of the most destructive conflict in world history.

***The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Back Bay Books, New York, 1995, 576 pages, \$18.95**. Drawing on interviews with senior offi-

cials, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor provide a behind-the-scenes look at the highest levels of military decisionmaking that determined the outcome of the Persian Gulf War. *The General's War* is an excellent primer for all senior leaders about the importance of personality in politics and war.

***On Becoming a Leader*, Warren Bennis, Perseus Publishing, Cambridge, MA, Revised edition, 2003, 256 pages, \$17.50.** Management expert Warren Bennis shows how individuals develop leadership traits and how organizations encourage or stifle potential leaders. He profiles dynamic figures from diverse business arenas to demonstrate how all leaders share distinctive characteristics. This provocative examination will encourage all aspiring leaders to take risks, embrace change, and transform their visions into reality.

***The Art of War*, Sun Tzu, Samuel Griffith, trans., Oxford University Press, New York, New edition 2003, 222 pages, \$9.95.** Written in China over 2,000 years ago, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* provides the first-known attempt to formulate a rational basis for planning and conducting military operations. These wise, aphoristic essays contain timeless principles acted on by such 20th-century Chinese generals as Mao Tse-tung.

***On War*, Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans., Princeton University Press, NJ, 1976, 711 pages, \$14.95.** This edition of *On War*, the third English version published, is easily the best. In this indexed edition, editors Michael Howard and Peter Paret provide an accurate translation from the original 1832 version. *On War* represents one of the greatest works on military thought and strategy ever written and contains ideas and concepts that apply at either the operational or the national level. Carl von Clausewitz remains essential reading for all senior leaders.

***Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, Michael I. Handel, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR, 2001, 425 pages, \$34.95.** *Masters of War* is a comparative analysis of the classical works on war and strategic thought by Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Atonine Henri Jomini, and Niccolo Machiavelli. The book illuminates the many similarities between the works of these authors and highlights the continuity in the logic of war through the ages. As such, it is a valuable compendium of military thought all senior officers and NCOs should read.

***The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Samuel Huntington, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981, 560 pages, \$24.95.** Blending the disciplines of history, sociology, and political science, Samuel Huntington's study should be required reading for Army officers. Huntington develops a theoretical framework with which to analyze civil-military relations. Particularly noteworthy is the preliminary discussion, "Officership as a Profession." The arguments Huntington sets forth in this section have colored the military's self-perception for an entire generation.

***The Future of the Army Profession*, Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, Project Directors, McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing, Highstown, NJ, 2002, 576 pages, \$28.75.** Who are the future members of the Army profession, and how is their competence to be certified to their client, the American people? *The Future of the Army Profession* is a contemporary analysis of the Army profession and its knowledge and expertise, with conclusions and policy recommendations. This book is important reading for all senior officers and NCOs who care about their Army.

For Senior Leaders above Brigade

***Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Free Press, New York, 1988, 329 pages, \$18.95.** History is a valuable tool for decisionmakers, but if used without careful consideration, it can blind the unwary with false analogies. This classic book offers senior leaders suggestions on how to use and avoid misusing the valuable experience history provides.

***The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Samuel Huntington, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1998, 368 pages, \$15.00.** In this incisive book, the renowned political scientist, Samuel Huntington, explains how "civilizations" have replaced nations and ideologies as the driving force behind global politics. While not everyone would agree with Huntington's main thesis, one cannot afford to ignore this important, persuasive book.

***The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, Thomas Friedman, Anchor, New York, 2000, 512 pages, \$15.95.** Thomas Friedman, the well-traveled *New York Times* foreign-affairs columnist, peppers *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* with engaging stories illustrative of his central theme—that globalization (the Lexus) is the central organizing principle of the post-Cold War world, although many individuals and nations resist by holding on to what has traditionally mattered to them (the olive tree). This book is an important primer on the modern world for all leaders.

***War in European History*, Michael Howard, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, 176 pages, \$17.95.** In this slim but important book, one of England's most distinguished historians brilliantly summarizes the evolution of warfare in Europe from the Roman Empire to the nuclear age. For U.S. senior leaders, Howard's book offers an excellent, thought-provoking introduction to the broader history of the profession of arms and the role war has played in the evolution of Western civilization.

***Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret and Gordon Craig, eds., Princeton University Press, NJ, 1986, 950 pages, \$35.00.** *Makers of Modern Strategy* is a wonderful anthology on the evolution of strategic thought. Moving from Niccolo Machiavelli to the present in 28 insightful essays, editors Peter Paret and Gordon Craig examine nuclear strategy. This book is a primer for all senior leaders who must think strategically on various issues.

***The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., Cambridge University Press, New York, New edition, 1996, 704 pages, \$27.99.** Some of the most respected scholars in the field of strategic studies examine the formulation of strategy in all its complexity in *The Making of Strategy*. Senior leaders will find useful insight into the cultural, social, political, and organizational dimensions of strategic decisions in cases ranging from the Peloponnesian Wars to the formulation of 20th-century U.S. nuclear policy. The 17 cases display continuities in the principles of strategic thinking and breaks the 700-page book into convenient individual readings.

***The Peloponnesian War*, Donald Kagan, Viking Books, New York, 2003, 511 pages, \$29.95.** Senior leaders will want to read this valuable account of coalition warfare on land and sea in Ancient Greece. The book focuses on Athens' and Sparta's strategic planning, of their shifting alliances, and the effect individual leadership and civil-military relations had on implementing those plans. After 24 centuries, the lessons of this great war between two powerful city-states are still valid: economic strength does not guarantee victory, nor does military might ensure the ability to make peace.

***Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*, H.R. McMaster, Perennial, New York, Reprint edition, 1998, 480 pages, \$16.00.** In this important book, H.R. McMaster argues persuasively that President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to fight the war on poverty, not the war in Vietnam. But, Johnson made decisions he believed would allow him to do both, which was a recipe for disaster. The Joint Chiefs of Staff exacerbated this by failing to provide Johnson with their best advice. *Dereliction of Duty* is a cautionary tale about how the military and its civilian leadership failed at the highest levels.

***Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, James R. Locher III, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2002, 524 pages, \$34.95.** *Victory on the Potomac* is a fascinating story of how Congress forced the Pentagon to undergo major reform during the mid-1980s. James R. Locher III, who was a major participant in the process, tells the inside story of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reforms that set the stage for increased jointness in the services. The book is an excellent primer on the creation of public policy and the interface between the Pentagon and Congress.

***The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050*, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001, 208 pages, \$30.00.** MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray provide a conceptual framework and historical context for understanding the patterns of change, innovation, and adaptation that have marked war in the Western world since the 14th century. Case studies and a conceptual overview offer senior leaders an indispensable introduction to military change.

***The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941*, Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2000, 247 pages, \$29.95.** *The Challenge of Change* examines how military institutions attempted to meet the demands of the new strategic, political, and technological realities of the turbulent era between World Wars I and II. The contributors chose France, Germany, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States as focus countries because those countries' military institutions endeavored to develop both the material capacity and the conceptual framework for conducting modern industrialized warfare on a continental scale.

***Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*, Douglas A. Macgregor, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2003, 320 pages, \$34.95.** In *Transformation Under Fire*, Douglas A. Macgregor builds on the success of his first book, *Breaking the Phalanx*, and lays out a blueprint for revolutionary change in how the U.S. Army is organized and how it fights. Macgregor argues that America needs a radically different military force to fight the global joint expeditionary warfare the Global War on Terrorism requires. This book is an interesting, if controversial, prescription that has many followers in today's Army. *Transformation Under Fire*, which is important reading for senior Army leaders, provides a starting point for any discussion on Transformation.

MR Review Essay

Ayman Al-Zawahiri's *Knights under the Prophet's Banner: The al-Qaeda Manifesto*

Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

To understand al-Qaeda, one must read the books of Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's principal ideologue and chief strategic thinker. After Osama bin-Laden, Al-Zawahiri is the most-wanted Middle Eastern terrorist. The FBI has a \$25 million reward for information leading to his capture or arrest.

In 2001, Al-Zawahiri published *Knights under the Prophet's Banner* (*Fursan Taht Rayah Al-Nabi*) even as the empire he built with Bin-Laden, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar crumbled under the weight of U.S. air, special operations forces, as well as the Northern Alliance assaults.¹ Initially serialized in the *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* newspaper in 12 installments beginning in early December 2001, *Knights under the Prophet's Banner* can now be found in the back alleys of any major Arab city.² The word "knights" in the title refers to the members of the jihadist movement while evoking the image of the knights of the crusades.

The book begins with Al-Zawahiri saying: "I have written this book . . . to fulfill the duty entrusted to me

towards our generation and future generations. Perhaps I will be unable to write afterwards in the midst of these circumstances and changing conditions." According to Al-Zawahiri, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks were just an opening salvo against the Christian and Jewish "infidels."

Al-Zawahiri sees the United States, Israel, and Israel's Western and Arab allies as the "first force" and Islamic militant movements that depend on God alone the "second force." He believes the United States is removing Islam from power through rigged elections, brutality, and force. He views treaties, peace negotiations, and bans on weapons as steps in the direct occupation of Muslim land by U.S. forces. To Al-Zawahiri, jihad is an ideological struggle for survival—a war with no truce. He believes the Islamic jihadist movement should strike Islam's enemies, using the Luxor incident of 1997 as the means and as an example.³ He supports the growth of jihad among youths and numbers his success in the tens of thousands of

young men in Arab prisons around the Middle East.

Al-Zawahiri says the jihad has not stopped, and the movement is either attacking or preparing an attack. He asserts Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's replacement of six interior ministers is proof of jihadist success. He also says acts of violence, beginning with the Egyptian Islamic jihad attack on the Military Technical College in 1974 and the agitation in Southern Egypt of the early 1980s, were poorly planned, emphasizing that deriving lessons from mistakes and improving the potency of jihadist operations should be hallmarks of Islamic militant movements.

From a U.S. military force-protection perspective, Part Seven of Al-Zawahiri's book reveals that the 1999 joint U.S.-Arab military exercise, Bright Star, was designed to keep fundamentalists from seizing political power, equating the exercise to the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798.⁴ He claims the timing of Bright star was not an accident; it was timed to observe the 200th anniversary of the French occupation of Egypt. To

him, U.S. troop commitments are evidence of a victory for jihad forces. He combines his interpretation of Islam, Egyptian history, and news reports on U.S.-Egyptian military exercises to weave his own conspiratorial web to encourage youth to embrace his political objectives through violence and terror.

Al-Zawahiri dreams of a future jihad in the southern Russian Republics, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan to unite a nuclear Pakistan and the gas-rich Caspian region to serve jihad. Al-Zawahiri identifies the following targets for al-Qaeda and its affiliates:

- The United Nations.
- Arab rulers.
- Multinational corporations.
- The Internet.
- International news and satellite media.
- International relief organizations, which he believes are covers for spying, proselytizing, attempted coups, and weapons transfers.

Al-Zawahiri urges Islamic militants to take matters into their own hands: "Tracking down Americans and Jews is not impossible. Killing them with a single bullet, stab, or a device made up of an explosive mix or hitting them with an iron rod is not impossible. [S]mall groups could [prove to] be a horror against Americans and Jews." These words bring to mind the actions of Beltway Snipers John Allen Muhammad and Lee Malvo, who killed 10 people in the Washington, D.C., area in a 2002 shooting spree. Mir Amal Kansi was another famous lone-jihadist, who killed two CIA agents in 1993. Kansi was caught in 1997 by the FBI in Pakistan and extradited to the United States.

Al-Zawahiri urges his followers to inflict maximum casualties in the West, advocates a cost-benefit assessment of martyrdom operations, urges attacks on the enemy's power structure, and advocates patience, planning, and maximum damage to cause mass disruption. Although he is not specific about targets, one can deduce he means banks, transportation links, and energy refineries.

The Al-Zawahiri and Bin-Laden tapes that appear on Al-Jazirah tele-

vision cannot be fully understood without first reading Al-Zawahiri's book. Creating a serious psychological operations campaign without delving into his book would be difficult.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad became so unpopular in Egypt in the late 1990s that Al-Zawahiri developed the strategy of striking the enemy (the United States) afar instead of near (Arab governments). Refuting Al-Zawahiri's theories and selective use of Islamic history is critical to the ideological fight against al-Qaeda.

For further study of Al-Zawahiri, I recommend *The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right Hand Man* by Islamist lawyer and former radical Montasser el-Zayat, who spent time in prison with Al-Zawahiri and is now highly critical of Al-Zawahiri's actions.⁵ This book, which is the best English translation of a critical analysis of Al-Zawahiri's theories, takes readers inside the mind of a geostrategic Islamic militant. The book is from El-Zayyat's original, *Al-Al-Zawahiri Kama Araftuh* (Al-Zawahiri as I knew him).⁶

These books represent the new frontier in military studies. Books by Islamic militants contain valuable tips for those involved in force protec-

tion, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency tactics. **MR**

NOTES

1. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, *Fursan Taht Rayah Al-Nabi* (Knights under the Prophet's Banner) (Casablanca, Morocco: Dar-al-Najaah Al-Jadeedah, 2001).

2. I prepared this review essay by collecting the 11 installments of the *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* in Arabic that first appeared in December 2001. The translation represents my understanding of the material. Any errors or omissions are my own.

3. In November 1997, the Egyptian Islamic extremist group al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG) staged a brutal attack that left 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians dead. The attack, which occurred at Hatshepsut's Temple in Luxor, became the worst attack on tourists in Egypt's history. See U.S. Department of State Publication 10535, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), on-line at <www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/1997index.html>, accessed 21 December, 2004.

4. Egyptian military forces and members of the U.S. Central Command's Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and special operations components participated in the 1999 Exercise Bright Star, a joint/combined training exercise in Egypt. Military forces from a dozen nations, including France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Spain, and the United Kingdom, participated in the exercise (Department of Defense News Release 485-01, 3 October 2001).

5. Montasser el-Zayat, *The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right Hand Man* (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004).

6. Zayyat, *Al-Al-Zawahiri Kama Araftuh* (Al-Zawahiri as I knew him) (Cairo: Dar Misr Al-Mahrusa, 2002).

Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy, is a Medical Service Corps and Middle East-North Africa Foreign Area Officer. He received a B.B.A. from the University of Mississippi, an M.B.A. and M.H.S.A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M.S. from the Joint Military Intelligence College. He is the Director for North Africa and Egypt and Special Advisor on Islamic militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Free Unit Subscriptions

Unit subscriptions are free and based on the following distribution:

- Headquarters of major commands, corps, divisions, major staff agencies, garrison commands, Army schools, Reserve commands, and Cadet Command organizations: 1 per 10 assigned field grade officers.
- Active and Reserve brigades and battalions: 1 per 5 assigned field grade officers.
- Medical commands, hospitals, and units: 1 per 25 assigned field grade officers.
- To order:
 - Write: *Military Review*, Attention: Managing Editor, Building 77, 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254.
 - Call: DSN 552-9327 or commercial (913) 684-9327.
 - E-mail: milrevweb@leavenworth.army.mil.

Hyman G. Rickover: Excellence, Greatness, Heroism

Colonel Gerald D. Evans, U.S. Army

Excellence is being good at something. Greatness is when you are the best at something. And, heroism comes as a result of a struggle that requires courage and personal sacrifice. So, was U.S. Navy Admiral Hyman G. Rickover a hero?

Born in Russian-occupied Poland, Rickover immigrated to the United States at an early age with his mother and older sister, who fled anti-Semitic pogroms of annihilation to join Rickover's father, a tailor and deserter from the Russian army, who had previously immigrated to America. The family fled to Belgium, where they boarded the *Finland* to cross the Atlantic to the United States. Once in America, the family moved to Chicago, and at age 9 Rickover began working to help support the family. Rickover characterized his childhood as one of "hard work, discipline, and a decided lack of good times."¹

During the 1916 Republican National Convention, Rickover skipped school, where he was not doing well academically, to deliver messages for politicians, stationing himself next to the speaker's platform to get as many deliveries as possible. One delivery was to a U.S. Congressman who later nominated him to the U.S. Naval Academy.

Rickover barely met the height and weight requirements at the Academy but passed the tough entrance examination. His poor academic background and the prevailing anti-Semitism of the time were his major obstacles at the Academy. He overcame the first with determined study, the second by not drawing attention to himself. He made few friends, was considered a loner and a "grind," and graduated 106th out of a class of 539.²

Rickover spent the next 6 years at sea. His supervisors described him as forceful, industrious, reliable, and extremely able. He was seen as an effective leader, despite being taciturn and uncongenial. One supervisor even wrote that he had "no outward

signs of qualities of leadership."³

In May 1929, Rickover graduated from Columbia University (where he also met his future wife, Ruth Masters) with a master's degree with distinction in electrical engineering. He then attended submarine school in New London, Connecticut, where he graduated fourth in his class in June 1930.⁴

Assigned to engineering duty on a submarine, the *S-48*, Rickover did well and qualified for command. Because no submarines were available, however, his next assignment was in the Office of the Inspector of Naval Material in Philadelphia. He was later assigned to engineering duty on the battleship *New Mexico*.

In July 1937, Rickover was promoted to the rank of lieutenant commander and became the commander of the minesweeper, *Finch*, an old ship well past its prime. Three months later he became an engineering duty officer (EDO), a technical specialty that barred him from commanding ships or submarines. Rickover's first EDO assignment was to the Cavite Navy Yard in the Philippines. In August 1939, the Navy assigned him to its Bureau of Ships (BuShips) in Washington, D.C.

Rickover, who developed a reputation as a talented troubleshooter and effective problem-solver, ensured education and training were priorities and achieved impressive results. Working days, nights, and weekends and expecting his staff to do the same, he refused to compromise when it came to standards and quality. He expected sacrifice from those who worked for him—and from their families. He became commander in January 1942 and captain in June 1943.

When World War II ended, the Navy sent Rickover to the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Manhattan Engineer District to study the feasibility of using nuclear power to propel submarines. Battery-powered electric motors limited underwater time in

submarines because diesel-powered generators charged the batteries, and the diesel engines used up the air in submarines. Nuclear generators greatly extended the time a submarine could stay submerged.

In August 1946, President Harry S. Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act, creating the Atomic Energy Commission to develop nuclear energy for military and peaceful uses. In July 1948, Vice Admiral Earle W. Mills chose Rickover to lead a group of engineers in developing nuclear-propelled submarines.

The group answered to the Navy, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a congressional committee with responsibility for all legislation dealing with atomic energy. Rickover's group, the Nuclear Power Branch, known as "Naval Reactors," made technical decisions, set technical standards, and supervised the program. Rickover was ruthless, "threatening, cajoling, and insulting those who stood in his way."⁵

In 1951 and 1952, Rickover was passed over for promotion to rear admiral. The Navy selection board for EDO admirals was composed of nine officers: six line and three engineer officers. The six line officers usually deferred to the three engineer officers in EDO selections, but the engineers on the board did not like Rickover.

With over 30 years in service, Rickover faced mandatory retirement unless he was promoted to rear admiral. Rickover's workers at Oak Ridge lobbied the Senate on his behalf, and Clair Blair, Jr., a submariner during World War II, wrote articles in *Time* and *Life* describing Rickover as an officer who "had declared war on naval indifference."⁶ As a result, the Armed Services Committee held up the Navy board's selections for rear admiral and investigated the Navy's promotion system. The Navy convened another promotion board and promoted Rickover to the rank of

admiral. Breaking with tradition, the six line officers outvoted the three engineer officers on the board.

On 25 June 1953, in the Idaho desert, Rickover brought the Mark I—the first nuclear-powered reactor designed for a submarine to full power. Over his fellow engineers' objections, he kept the reactor at full power for 96 hours, the length of time it would take to propel a submarine across the Atlantic Ocean.

On 17 January 1955, the first nuclear-powered submarine, the *Nautilus*, embarked on its first sea trial. Rickover was onboard when "underway on nuclear power" became a part of naval history. The next day the *Nautilus* made its first dive, setting numerous high-speed records while submerged, and later, crossed under the polar ice cap.⁷ Another nuclear submarine, the *Triton*, circumnavigated the world in 84 days while submerged, a record that still stands. The lethality of nuclear submarines would ultimately be awesome.

Rickover was promoted to vice admiral in 1958 and admiral in 1973. Congressional action once again prompted these promotions.⁸

A superb public relations man, Rickover arranged for congressmen to ride on nuclear submarines and saw to it that submarines were named for congressmen who supported him. He also wrote letters to congressmen from submarines during sea trials, giving them updates they could pass along to the press; he answered telephone inquiries, made himself available for interviews, and made sure the press was on hand when he gave submarine rides to congressmen. Lloyd Norman, a Pentagon reporter, said: "Every service academy and war college should include a course in public and Congressional relations with lectures and textbooks by [Secretary of State] Henry Kissinger and Admiral Rickover, both of whom are outstanding experts in those fields."⁹

Because of Rickover, a "nuclear" Navy grew within the "real" Navy. Officers on nuclear-powered ships had two chains of command: the usual chain to the Chief of Naval Operations, the second to Rickover. Rickover made it clear he wanted to be called first. With representatives in the field at civilian construction facilities and naval facilities who reported problems directly to him, and

as the safety czar for the Atomic Energy Commission, he relieved officers or shut down entire projects if he felt safety was being jeopardized.

Eventually Rickover's support in Congress waned, and problems with contractors were blamed on him. In 1977, the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished and the Department of Energy absorbed its functions. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was also abolished, its functions split between several other committees.¹⁰

Bitterness grew between Rickover and the industries that built the ships because of his high standards and their cost overruns. Rickover was far too rigid to compromise with industry—or anyone for that matter. His career survived until 1982 when President Ronald Reagan forced him to resign.

Leadership

In a speech in 1973, Rickover said: "Organization doesn't really accomplish anything. Plans don't accomplish anything, either. Theories of management don't much matter. Endeavors succeed or fail because of the people involved. Only by attracting the best people will you accomplish great deeds."¹¹

Rickover envisioned himself a savior and martyr: "Most of the work in the world today is done by those who work too hard; they comprise a nucleus of martyrs."¹² He was also complex and unpredictable. Reportedly he sent an officer whose wife was sick on a trip then appeared at the man's home and cooked food for the family. Compassionate when tragedies struck those who worked for him, he sent personal handwritten letters of condolence to widows and parents when submariners were lost at sea.

In 1911, mechanical engineer and systems analysis advocate Frederick Taylor proposed the use of scientific measurements to determine the most economical and accurate way of getting work done.¹³ Taylor believed managers and workers should share the work, and it was a manager's responsibility to look for the best scientifically-proven methodology. Rickover, although probably influenced by "Taylorism," did not share Taylor's obsession with efficiency; Rickover was obsessed with perfection and safety.

Mary Parker Follett, a Radcliff-educated social worker, wrote about management in the early 20th century. Considered a "prophet of management" and a keen student of group behavior, Follett understood that relationships within a group mattered because they affected the group's accomplishments. Emphasizing mutual problem-solving, she advocated sharing power with workers instead of exercising power over them and originated the concept of "horizontal management."¹⁴ Rickover shared Follett's belief in the need for lifelong learning and the importance of education, but he did not believe in Follett's horizontal-management theory.

In the book, *Good to Great*, Jim Collins says the CEOs of 11 companies that consistently outperformed the stock market over a 15-year period had only two consistent traits: "compelling personal modesty" and "intense professional will."¹⁵ The CEOs also invariably gave the people they worked with credit for their company's success. Charismatic leadership was not required for greatness. Great leaders did not stand out; what they accomplished stood out.¹⁶ I am reminded here of Rickover's efficiency reports. He got results despite of having "no outward signs of qualities of leadership."¹⁷ Certainly Rickover was highly motivated to succeed and had incredible will, but it was a stretch to say he was modest.

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations from 1971 to 1974, said: "Rickover is paranoid. . . . He [has turned] the world into an asylum. . . . The enemies of the U.S. Navy are the Soviet Union, the U.S. Air Force, and Rickover. His Division of Nuclear Propulsion [is] a totalitarian mini-state."¹⁸

The highly stressful interviews to which Rickover subjected candidates for the nuclear propulsion program were controversial. Rickover covered a broad range of subjects including "professional background, professional interests, family background, extracurricular affairs, and outside reading." Although candidate Zumwalt described his interview as "thorough, searching, and friendly," his brief initial interview with Rickover was insulting. Rickover told Zumwalt he had no imagination or initiative and berated him for trying to conduct the interview himself.¹⁹ Rickover

then dismissed Zumwalt to wait in another room until Rickover thought he was "ready to be interviewed properly."²⁰ Zumwalt waited about 30 minutes in what he described as a "barren room." During Zumwalt's next interview, Rickover asked Zumwalt questions and digressed to a discussion of Clarence Darrow. When Zumwalt disagreed with Rickover on the subject, Rickover directed Zumwalt to leave, referring to him as an "aide that tries to pretend he knows everything."²¹

During the third session, Rickover discussed the Naval Academy and asked Zumwalt what he would do with the curriculum if he were the superintendent. Again the two men disagreed and again Rickover insulted Zumwalt. Rickover asked Zumwalt questions about philosophy and Plato. More disagreement and more insulting comments followed and back Zumwalt went to the "barren room."

During the final session, Rickover asked questions about high school mathematics, nuclear power, leadership, Zumwalt's father, his marriage, and his children. When the interview was over, Zumwalt says Rickover referred to him as "stupid," "a jerk,"

and "greasy." Zumwalt describes Rickover as "sneering" and "shouting."²²

In *Good to Great and Built to Last*, Collins notes Rickover placed great importance on the right people for the job—"only those that fit extremely well. . . ."²³ Rickover biographers Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen suggest Rickover used such tactics to weed out those who took the "victim" role.²⁴

Sacrifice

Rickover's limited ability to compromise gave him a strong need to sacrifice one thing for another. When he left Poland, he saw the need for sacrifice, sacrificing family time with his first job, sacrificing people to get the job done, sacrificing the Navy when he stopped wearing the uniform, and sacrificing his religion when he got married. Rickover did not appreciate the vast expanse of gray that exists between extremes.

Rickover was ultimately driven out of the Navy because of a faulty vision. His vision to build a nuclear-powered submarine was great; his vision to build an all-nuclear-powered Navy was not. Although Rickover is considered the father of the atomic submarine, he might be re-

membered more for being the man who should have quit when he was ahead.

Rickover was not a Navy organization man, but he was most certainly "a Rickover" organization man, and planning and organization were essential to him, but they had to be *his* plans and *his* organization. He recognized the importance of having not only the best people, but the best people in the right job. The Navy sent him the best; he selected those who would fit into his organization and would accept *his* philosophy and style.

Rickover certainly achieved greatness, but was he a hero? We expect real-life heroes to engage in some behavior that places them at personal risk or to make personal sacrifices primarily for the benefit of others. Did Rickover's sacrifices for nuclear propulsion qualify him to be a hero? Did he make those sacrifices for the benefit of the American people? Did he make them because he was internally driven? And, did he make America a safer place for democracy? Some would say yes; some would say no. **MR**

NOTES

1. Duncan F. Rickover, *The Struggle for Excellence* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, *Rickover: Controversy and Genius: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1982), 34.
2. Polmar and Allen; Rickover.
3. Rickover, 25; Rickover Papers, Fitness Reports, 1 October 1925-31 March 1926, 1 April 1925-11 June 1926.
4. Polmar and Allen; Rickover.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Rickover, 139.
7. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976).
8. James C. Collins, *Good to Great* (New York: HarperBusiness, 2001), vii.
9. Polmar and Allen; Rickover.
10. Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 167.
11. Powell.
12. Polmar and Allen.
13. Frederick W. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1919).
14. Pauline Graham, ed., *Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of Management: A Celebration of Writings from the 1920s* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).
15. Collins, *Good to Great*.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Polmar and Allen.
18. Zumwalt, Jr., 85; Polmar and Allen, 102.
19. Zumwalt, Jr., 86.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. Collins, *Good to Great*; Collins with Jerry I. Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies* (New York: HarperBusiness, 1994), 9.
24. Polmar and Allen, 639.

Colonel Gerald D. Evans, U.S. Army, is currently assigned to a unit in Iraq. He received a B.S. from the University of South Dakota; an M.D. from the University of Nebraska Medical School, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various positions in the continental United States, Korea, Germany, and Iraq.

MR Digest

Geospatial Intelligence

Ralph M. Erwin

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides timely, relevant, accurate geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) to support national security objectives. Geospatial intelligence, which provides unique knowledge not available by other means, is critical for informed national security decisions. Geospatial-Intelligence also provides objective, precisely measurable information about the environment and potential adversaries, especially in remote or inaccessible regions.

On 24 November 2003, when President George W. Bush signed the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency officially became the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The new

name describes the agency's new mission—ensuring the Nation's warfighters and senior policymakers receive the best geospatial intelligence possible in support of national security.

GEOINT's doctrinal definition includes the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on Earth. GEOINT provides the framework for intelligence preparation of the battlefield and planning before, during, and after a conflict. GEOINT analysts help make strategic- to tactical-level decisions every day based on accurate and timely GEOINT.

(continued on following page)

When an NGA support team deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it took with it a reachback capability to NGA's extensive staff and production elements in the United States. According to "America at War: Technology Lessons Learned," a March 2004 report by the National Technology Alliance, NGA's "use of direct support teams provides a large success in Afghanistan and Iraq." The report states: "The teams were not simply an NGA liaison; rather NGA fielded many of its skilled analysts and technicians together with fully geographic information systems, imagery processing computers, workstations, and field equipment. . . ."

One successful example was NST's ability to download high-resolution imagery less than a week old, which allowed U.S. Army Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, V Corps commander, to "walk through" his in-

vasion route before entering Iraq. Wallace "came away from that session confident that the route would present no problems," the report states.

NGA is moving from a hardcopy "product" orientation to a data-centric digital environment. Customers will have ready access to GEOINT databases through an open architecture of interoperable, commercial systems, and a robust communications infrastructure. NGA's geospatial-intelligence feature database is the foundation for the Theater Geospatial Database in support of U.S. Army Europe and Pacific.

The NGA Support Team-Army, based in Reston, Virginia, provides direct support to all Army activities and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). A staff officer is stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to support the Combined Arms Command, Command and

General Staff College, and other major TRADOC offices.

Integrating knowledge of the adversary and the environment provides a better understanding of the security situation and represents GEOINT's unique contribution to the Nation's overall intelligence picture. GEOINT efforts draw from all sources of intelligence and information to meet the needs of the Nation's civilian and military decisionmakers by reducing uncertainty. NGA's mandate is to provide timely, relevant, accurate GEOINT in support of joint and expeditionary warfighters who must remain relevant and ready. **MR**

Ralph M. Erwin is the NGA Staff Officer to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He received a B.A. from Cameron University and an M.S.S. from the U.S. Army War College. The public Website for NGA is at <www.nga.mil>.

MR Book Reviews

UNEASY BALANCE: Civil-Military Relations in Peacetime America Since 1783, Thomas S. Langston, The Johns Hopkins University Press, New York, 2003, 198 pages, \$39.95.

After every war the U.S. military has to realign itself by taking stock of and reorienting to society's peacetime needs. The realignment that should have occurred at the end of the Cold War has not yet happened. *Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military Relations in Peacetime America Since 1783* tracks previous realignments and discusses the implications of the failure to complete the one currently overdue.

Contrary to popular belief, the U.S. military has not yet put Vietnam behind it, says author Thomas S. Langston, professor of political science at Tulane University. For that matter, neither the military nor the civilian population have adjusted to the end of the Cold War. While the military and the populace look into their rearview mirrors, civilian defense leaders push forward, using the military as a social laboratory for changes too radical for society at large or jumping vigorously into

nationbuilding and foreign adventures while stretching the military over the globe. Because there is neither consensus nor cooperation, current U.S. military policy is unbalanced, if not dysfunctional.

Postwar realignments have two components: service and reform. Service is the reestablishment of connection to the peacetime role of helping the populace rather than fighting wars. Reform is the introspective component, the studying of the failures and success of just-finished wars and making appropriate adjustments in capabilities—training and retooling. For civilian and military components to be successful, both must agree on the desired end product. This happened fully only twice: after the War of 1812 and after the Spanish-American War. In other postwar eras, one side or the other was dominant, and the results were mediocre to awful. Fortunately, none was disastrous.

The current era might see the first disaster. Civil-military relations are dismal; the military is more contemptuous of a civilian society from which it is increasingly isolated. At the

policy level, there is no clear consensus on what the military posture should be or what roles it should serve. Not only is there a civil-military split, there is disunity within the military as well. Because there is no consensus, the post-Cold War realignment is stalled.

Langston identifies the problem, and as a good political scientist, has at least the beginnings of a solution—to get on with reform; reestablish civil-military communication and consensus; make the military capable of fighting old-style and new-style wars while also building nations at home or abroad—the way the Coast Guard handles war and peace missions simultaneously. More important, the military should stop hiding from Vietnam-style wars and learn to win them instead.

These recommendations are not bombshells; they are mostly common sense. But the consequences of letting this reform period drift can be dire—armed isolationism, if civilians dominate; perhaps unchecked militarism, if the military prevails. Langston is not totally optimistic the drift will be checked in time.

Although brief, the book is a sensible mix of description, analysis, and prescription. At a minimum it deserves a quick reading and extended contemplation.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

ENOLA GAY AND THE COURT OF HISTORY, Robert P. Newman, Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2004, 201 pages, \$24.95.

Show me where someone stood on the nuclear-freeze movement in 1985, and 9 times out of 10, I will show you where they stand on the bombing of Hiroshima in 1945. Robert P. Newman, professor emeritus of political communication, is a noted exception. He was an outspoken critic of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and a fierce critic of the fierce critics of President Harry S. Truman's use of the atomic bomb. Newman is one of the select people who want to learn about the past to simply learn about the past, not to distort it for political ammunition. In 1995, Newman published *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult* (Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 1995), a book that devastated the contention that Japan was already prepared to surrender but that Washington had hidden agendas, such as scaring the Soviet Union by flexing its atomic muscle against this third party.

Newman reiterates why Truman was correct—that he had to use the bomb or face perhaps a million American casualties during the invasion and the subsequent ground war to be waged in Japan. The six subsequent chapters are a history of the critique of Truman from its origins in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) in 1945 to its culmination in an exhibit at the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum in 1994 of the airplane that dropped the atomic bomb.

The chief villain in the narrative is the chairman of the USSBS, Paul Nitze, a man Newman seems to loathe from the left or from the right. He says that subsequent to 1945, Nitze inflated the Soviet military threat in an irrational pursuit of nuclear overkill. His summary report in the USSBS was equally fallacious, but this time for holding that Japan would surrender before the prospective American

invasion in November, subject or not to the atomic bomb.

Nitze certainly did not hold, as others would, that Truman was striking a blow against the Kremlin. Indeed, Nitze compiled a record criticizing government policy as being too soft on the Soviet Union. While investigating the bombing of Germany, before the bombing of Japan, Nitze concluded that leveling cities was virtually useless as opposed to taking out transportation networks, a tactic that could compel surrender. He applied this European Theater paradigm to the Pacific, where he concluded conventional bombing and a naval blockade was sufficient to win the war. For data, Nitze cited purported testimony from Japanese officials, something Newman has never been able to find in the records and the archives of the USSBS.

Whether Nitze's conclusions stood on fact or what Newman calls "fraud," it had the imprimatur of an official report. It hence became argumentative gold for people who normally would dismiss any government publication as a coverup, *prima facie*. In the 1960s and 1970s, New Left history cites the USSBS as definitive proof, another case where contemporary "peace movement" politics slanted views on events regarding Hiroshima. The USSBS was to have made up much of the story line in captions for the *Enola Gay* at the National Air and Space Museum. Because the Smithsonian Institution is semi-government, conservatives in Congress aborted the exhibit. One of Truman's critics wrote, "It was a humiliating spectacle, scholars being forced to recant the truth." Newman replies (although he was no political fan of the conservative bloc): "Scholars who confuse the fraudulent Nitze narrative with truth deserve humiliation."

Newman and company might have won the battle of the Smithsonian, but time does not seem on their side. According to the Gallup Poll, 10 percent of Americans disapproved of Truman's decision in 1945, 35 percent in 1995; young adults were divided 46 percent in favor, 49 percent opposed. One can only hope the citizenry reads Newman to discover the origins and the development of the fallacious thesis many now hold.

Michael Pearlman, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AFGHANISTAN: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, Stephen Tanner, Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 351 pages, \$17.95.

There have been several excellent military histories written about Afghanistan, including A.E. Snesev's *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, published in Russian in 1921; Percy Sykes' two-volume *A History of Afghanistan*, published in English in 1940; Ali Ahmad Jalali's three-volume *Military History of Afghanistan*, published in Dari in 1976; and Yu V. Gankovskiy's *A History of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan*, published in Russian in 1985. Unfortunately, all are difficult to find today and only one is published in English. Stephen Tanner has done well producing a quick English-language history about an obscure area of the world that suddenly is vitally important.

Afghanistan sits at the crossroads of empires and has long been a battleground. The Greeks, Indians, Persians, Mongolians, British, and Russians have tried to hold Afghanistan. Internal strife has been constant, and Afghan forces have always been better prepared to fight an internal threat than an external invasion. Afghanistan's warring mountain tribes have always proven the invaders' ultimate test. Today, as the United States and other coalition forces are sitting in Afghan cities and airfields, there is a pressing need for a book that provides the history and background of this land-locked mountainous country.

Tanner has produced a history of a remote and little-understood region in record time. Unfortunately, as with any rapid effort, there are a few problems. Tanner perpetuates mistaken information the West put out early in the Soviet-Afghan War: misidentification of the divisions used in the invasion, inflation of the number of tanks involved, and misidentification of weapons systems. He also perpetuates the myth of the poor quality of the Central Asian reservists and the myth that the Stinger knocked hundreds of aircraft from the sky. (The Soviets changed their aviation tactics quickly to avoid this very scenario.) From a historian's perspective, the book's biggest problem is a lack of footnotes or endnotes,

making it almost impossible to substantiate Tanner's claims.

Is this book useful to the professional soldier or statesman inbound for Afghanistan? Yes. The book provides a rapid introduction to a historically complex region in an easy-to-read style. This book will not be the textbook on Afghanistan's military history 100 years from now, but who cares? It fills an immediate need and provides background information for the professional to consider while maneuvering through Afghan politics and an incipient guerrilla war.
LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE BATTLE FOR LENINGRAD, 1941-1944, David M. Glantz, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2002, 704 pages, \$39.95.

David M. Glantz has been called by some the foremost authority on Russia's "Great Patriotic War." His previous works, including (*The Battle of Kursk, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars* [University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1999] and *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* [University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1998]) were acclaimed among the finest books written about the Eastern Front. Glantz's latest effort, *The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944*, continues the tradition.

Of the many books written about the fight for Leningrad, most focus on the tactical fights and civilian situations inside the city and are from purely Russian or German points of view. Glantz uses many recently released documents (particularly from Russia) to provide details rarely seen elsewhere and correct some misconceptions concerning the battle. Such detail separates *The Battle for Leningrad* from other books on the subject.

Glantz blends personal accounts, field orders, and excerpts from the Leningrad War Diary to tell the story. For each battle and campaign, he describes key decisions and orders of battle, and provides a wealth of statistics, giving the reader a total perspective on the Battle of Leningrad and its significance.

Glantz's superb analysis is the strongest aspect of the book. Using his vast military experience to analyze

events and decisions on both sides, he focuses on the operational level of war but also gives his thoughts on actions taken at the tactical level. Glantz has the rare ability to discuss what happened and, more important, why it happened.

This book is not for everyone; it is written for those with experience on the subject who desire to take that experience to a higher level. The reader must be ready to stay focused and devote energy to its pages. One of my friends said, "Glantz can make your head hurt!" But, what is a little pain when you can read a definitive history on the struggle for Leningrad.

LTC Rick Bailergeron, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE UNITED STATES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC SINCE 1945, Roger Buckley, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002, 258 pages, \$65.00.

The United States in the Asia-Pacific Since 1945 could have been an exercise in academic absurdity and cruelty, but instead enlightens and educates. In seven chronologically organized chapters, Roger Buckley outlines U.S. policy in East and Southeast Asia since 1945 when Japan surrendered.

In 1945, Asia was defined by colonial powers trying to reassert dominion over their colonies with nationalist movements in armed struggle with them, and a prostrate Japan—the object of Soviet and U.S. interest. The United States was the paramount power, but initial U.S. actions were hesitant. This apparent irresolution was caused by the resolve to support anticommunist forces in Europe and Asia while also trying to keep the Cold War from spreading to the region. Although there were differences between European and Asian policies, they were matters of degree, not substance.

The Korean War chapter emphasizes Soviet and U.S. confusion over Korea and the complexity of its internal politics and rivalries. The effects of the war included a peace treaty with Japan, increased Japanese economic growth, a clarification of U.S. interests in China and Taiwan, and a new alliance, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).

In the postwar period (1953-1960), the gravity of international rivalry

shifted to Southeast Asia. Buckley briefly outlines the events leading up to the 1954 Geneva Conference and its results for Indochina; British interests in Malaya; the Taiwan Straits Crises; and the ways they affected U.S. policy. The chapter on the Vietnam War is a straightforward summary of events, dealing with the major interpretive issues surrounding U.S. commitments, the conduct of the war, and eventual U.S. withdrawal. He concludes that "the result of the Vietnam disaster . . . was a harvest of rancor."

Buckley follows with a description of the consequences of the Vietnam War, events that occurred during the last part of the Cold War, and the rise and relative decline of Southeast Asia as an economic power. He relates how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became an organization that stresses economic cooperation and mutual benefit.

The chapter on the region since the end of the Cold War emphasizes U.S. policy continuity, and although the Soviet Union collapsed, none of Asia's Communist states show signs of disappearing. In fact, China has become a regional economic power.

Buckley outlines alternatives for future U.S. policy, including power and influence, to encourage a greater sense of cooperation among allies. He believes Japan remains an American dependency because of its own problematic relationships with the region as well as its public disinterest in foreign affairs. He points out that the era that began with the surrender in Tokyo Bay is far from over; the events since 1945 show a U.S. determination to remain committed in the region. Buckley's conclusion reflects his optimism about the U.S. presence in Asia. U.S. influence is the result of its open society rather than merely being a factor of economic and military power.

Asians might think some of Buckley's judgments of U.S. policies are too complimentary, while many Americans might find his evaluations overly critical, but that is one of the work's benefits; it is written by an outsider. I recommend this book to all who wish to quickly gain a basic understanding of how U.S. policies affect the Asia-Pacific region.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Huntsville, Alabama

CANNAE: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, Gregory Daly, Routledge, New York, 2002, 253 pages, \$35.00.

With *Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War*, Gregory Daly forges one of the most comprehensive analytical studies of the battle ever attempted. Drawing on ancient and modern source material, Daly crafts an account of the battle that explores in detail the field armies arrayed against one another at Cannae.

Daly, in his description of the detailed composition of forces and the intricacies of operational planning, spares no effort in producing a scholarly account without parallel. The result is a thoroughly engaging, captivating battle study—supremely analytical, yet at times reminiscent of Basil Liddell-Hart or General George C. Marshall in his treatment of the human dimension of conflict. Although the book is heavily laden with references, Daly unhesitatingly draws his own conclusions while evolving a uniquely personal perspective on the classic battle.

Daley presents a refreshingly comprehensive analysis and brings facts and references into a single volume worthy of any bookshelf dedicated to warfare in the classical world. Military professionals will appreciate the scholarly effort required to catalog the myriad details of the battle. Students of history will welcome a single-source reference for this monumental battle that so shaped events of our own time.

**MAJ Steven Leonard, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

PEN OF FIRE: John Moncure Daniel, Peter Bridges, The Kent State University Press, Kent, OH, 2002, 284 pages, \$28.00.

Arguably, there is nothing as satisfying to read as a biography with an easy-to-follow story and focused material. Stretched even further, you might say there is nothing as satisfying to read as a biography about an obscure historical character. John Moncure Daniel, onetime fiery editor of the polemic *Richmond Examiner*, is just such a character. Daniel, who has been treated tangentially in other historical works, is given fresh

life with this new work.

Peter Bridges seeks to present Daniel in three ways: Daniel the man—a consistent treatment throughout the book that seeks to reveal “who” Daniel was; Daniel the editor—a role that applies only to those times when Daniel was the fiery editor for which he is purportedly well known; Daniel the diplomat—and herein lies the treasure of the book. While Daniel might be attributed a certain importance for his role as an editor and producer of Civil War-era polemics, it is his role as a diplomat that allows for new historical relationships and new conceptualizations.

In the late 1840s, Europe was a hotbed of “almost” revolutions. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, nationalism was a force to be reckoned with and one that would, not far down the road, see its day in the sun. The unification movements taking place in Italy and Germany in the late 1840s, up until their successful resolution in the 1870s, are a source of interest even today. Count Camillo Cavour, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, was the spearhead of the Italian unification movement. Based on his position, his role was central until his dismissal by Vittorio Emanuele II—a relationship worth exploring.

Daniel was appointed minister resident to the Kingdom of Sardinia at the capital of Turin in 1853. After a few minor setbacks, he established himself successfully and remained at the post until 1861. His dealings with the Sardinian Government are most interesting, and much is made of the roles of Cavour, Giuseppe Mazzini, and Giuseppe Garibaldi. Of significance is the relationship between Daniel and these three men who shared a completely different orbit than that of a pro-slavery editor.

The only criticism with the book is that occasionally Bridges tries to create drama where none exists. One example is Daniel’s various attacks on Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Bridges concludes with a passage that leads the reader to believe Davis might have been angry about Daniel’s attack. While this might be valuable in fostering a sense of drama or furthering the story, as a tool of history it has no value.

Pen of Fire is definitely worth reading. It is valuable for those inter-

ested in Civil War history, diplomatic history, European history, and of course, as a biographical work. Overall, it is well written and well researched.

**David Schepp,
Fort Benning, Georgia**

SUNBURST: The Rise of Japanese Naval Aviation 1909-1941, Mark R. Peattie, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2002, 392 pages, \$25.81.

Almost 15 years ago Mark R. Peattie and the late David C. Evans were asked to collaborate on a study of Japanese Naval Strategy during World War II. As their work progressed, their topic expanded and changed into a technical, strategic, and institutional history of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) from its beginnings to the outbreak of war with the United States in 1941. The result was the publication in 1997 of the definitive English-language work on the IJN. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941* (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1997) includes four chapters on naval aviation that, for reasons of length and size, were removed for publication as a separate work at a later date. *Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Aviation 1909-1941* is the continuation of *Kaigun*.

Author Mark R. Peattie makes it clear that, for issues of institutional and even strategic context, reference to *Kaigun* is required. With this requirement understood, one finds *Sunburst* an extremely informative, insightful book. If the book has a thesis, it is that Japanese naval air power was among the most fearsome tools ever fashioned and that in great measure the success of the Pacific blitzkrieg in the first 6 months of the Pacific war is directly attributable to this elite body of warriors. Peattie is a wonderful scholar and has made outstanding use of the archival Japanese War History Series he has so successfully mined in the past.

As with *Kaigun*, *Sunburst’s* major drawback is it ends too soon. The wonderful institutional insight offered after the outbreak of war with the United States need not have overly lengthened the book, especially since almost half of its 400 pages consist of appendices. Instead, Peattie summarizes this period

in an all-too-brief final chapter. Having an institutional history that comprehensively covers the entire period of the Japanese naval aviation to 1945 would have been nice, especially in terms of understanding the problem of Japanese-pilot replenishment after the air battles over the Coral Sea, Midway, and especially, Guadalcanal.

On the other hand, Peattie includes a number of valuable and lavishly illustrated appendices that range from biographical sketches to air group composition to tactics. These make this book not only good to read but also a handy and easy-to-use resource. John Parshall again contributes his wonderful graphics work in illustrating the various platforms. Overall, *Sunburst* is a wonderful contribution to the literature about the Imperial Japanese Navy and a valuable resource for scholars and history buffs alike.

**CDR John T. Kuehn, USN,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

ALAMEIN, Jon Latimer, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 338 pages, \$17.95.

Jon Latimer's *Alamein* is an excellent companion to Rick Atkinson's *An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, 1942-1943* (Henry Holt & Co., New York, 2002). Latimer does not focus on the battle per se, instead he places the battle in the overall strategic and operational context. In a fair and judicious manner, he discusses Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery's role and analyzes Montgomery's preparation for battle and the decisions he made during the battle.

Latimer also extensively discusses the British fight in North Africa that led up to *Alamein* and includes background material on doctrine, organization, training, and material. He also discusses the complementary air and naval interdiction campaigns in the Mediterranean, the role of intelligence, the contributions of Commonwealth allies, the constraints political leaders imposed, and the British Army's command problems.

The book illustrates the following important theoretical constructs, such as when—

- German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel reached a culminating point in his advance to Alamein.

- British Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck experienced an operational pause after Rommel reached Alamein.

- Air and maritime campaigns were needed to complement a ground campaign to achieve overall strategic goals.

- Fog and friction were endemic on the battlefield.

- Deception activities had to be integrated with the operational plan.

- Coalition warfare took time and patience.

I appreciate Latimer's comments about British Army command problems, such as the placement of British officers in command of more senior Commonwealth officers; the mistrust between services; key leaders who were incommunicado at critical times; the faulty planning that led to fratricide or tactical failure; and the use of brevity codes subordinates did not understand.

I believe this book would be easier to follow if there were more maps and if they were better integrated within the text. At times, I was unsure where the battle was in relation to the maps, or I found the appropriate map either too small or lacking needed detail. Aside from this shortcoming, overall, this was a great book.

**LTC Christopher E. Bailey, USA,
Charlottesville, Virginia**

RE-EXAMINING THE COLD WAR: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 504 pages, \$25.00.

Re-Examining the Cold War is a collection of essays resulting from a partnership between the China Foreign Affairs College and the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University. Editors Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin examine the ways national interests, security concerns, economic interests, and domestic politics affected Cold War Sino-American relations and have fashioned a mosaic that brings still-relevant patterns of confrontation, communication, and negotiation into sharp relief.

The chronologically arranged book begins with William C. Kirby's succinct description of the origins of Sino-American conflict. He limns the events in post-World War II Asia and

concludes that the opposing alliances were the basis for Sino-American relations in the 1950s. Zhang Baijia reviews the Chinese-American confrontation in Asia and concludes that mutual fear governed bilateral relations during the period.

In the next three chapters, Ronald W. Preussen, Robert Accinelli, and Gong Li discuss the relatively unknown Taiwan Straits crises during the 1950s. All concentrate on crisis management and diplomatic maneuvering, their conclusions dovetailing with each other. Gong writes that Mao Tse-tung's goal was to "puncture the arrogance of the KMT [Kuomintang] army" while avoiding a war with the United States. Preussen and Accinelli show that U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles retained tactical flexibility by avoiding extreme measures that would result in a war.

Authors Zhang Baijia, Jia Qingguo, and Steven M. Goldstein focus on the ambassadorial-level talks between China and the United States—a neglected topic because no significant agreements were reached. However, the authors believe the meetings were noteworthy because they offered the two powers a communication channel that helped moderate disagreements and indirectly laid the groundwork for U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's opening to China. Essayist Robert D. Schulzinger reassesses China's policy during U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration. He states that a different view of China, in which it was not a relentlessly expansionist power, undermined one of the premises for American involvement in Vietnam.

Rosemary Foot and Li Jie analyze the role domestic politics played in forming foreign policy in both countries. Foot asserts the reexamination of American life and society that occurred in the 1960s forced a review of China policy. Li recounts a similar process taking place in China. The border conflicts with the Soviet Union, along with the chaos engendered by the Cultural Revolution, forced Mao to revise his views on domestic radicalism and relations with the United States. Gong Li continues this discussion, pointing out there was a contradiction between Mao's radical domestic agenda and his pragmatic foreign policy. This

contradiction and the fear of a war with the Soviet Union led to an opening to the United States. Finally, Michael Schaller shows how détente in the early 1970s had unforeseen consequences for all three parties.

The essays present mirror images of Chinese and American policy. One sees that each power was frustrated by its inability to shape the other's foreign policies and international behavior. Hostility reached a high point during the Taiwan Straits crises where both sides glared at each other but purposely avoided an armed confrontation. While Eisenhower and Dulles worked to restrain Chinese General Chiang Kai-shek, the Communist goal was to demonstrate to him the impossibility of reconquering the mainland.

In addition, Eisenhower's administration worked to continue Presi-

dent Harry S. Truman's administration policy of preventing Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia by driving a wedge between Russia and China to destroy their alliance.

The essays illustrate that rationality in foreign policy is relative, and rationality and irrationality exist on a continuum with no sharp breaks. Above all, they show that foreign policies are encounters between cultures and a confrontation among values. Both China and the United States had foreign policies driven by "soft" culture-bound factors (beliefs, moral values, and historical consciousness) as well as so-called "hard realities" (economic and military power).

There is one caveat. While the papers of Chinese scholars are intriguing and provide needed and necessary insight into the ways foreign

policy was formed, scholars have raised questions about the sources they used. Their essays are based on recently released material compiled and published by the Documents Research Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Documents that would show previous leaders in an unflattering light have been excluded, and the Central Party Archives are closed to Chinese researchers. Until scholars working in China have the same access to material that scholars working in the United States have, a complete, balanced history of the period cannot be written. Despite its shortcoming, this book opens new research panoramas and vantage points for the interested reader.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D.,
Huntsville, Alabama

MR Letters

Redefining the Foreign Area Officer's Role: A Response

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Friedenbergh, *U.S. Army, Ashburn, Virginia*—In the May-June 2004 *Military Review*, Major General Michael A. Vane and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Fagundes's article, "Redefining the Foreign Area Officer's Role," analyzed the current state of the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program (FA48). The FAO community and the U.S. Army benefit from colleagues taking an interest in how FAOs fit within the framework of the Army and also in the conduct of national security policy. The U.S. Army is in transition, and the FAO functional area will likely undergo changes to reflect emerging requirements.

Vane and Fagundes made several suggestions for improving how FAOs function; however, some of their statements need to be corrected. They say foreign-language ability is an "enabler" for FAOs. For them to identify language ability merely as an enabler mischaracterizes and devalues what is arguably one of the most critical assets FAOs bring to their commanders. Vane and Fagundes

also say the FAO assignment system suffers from a "Cold War mentality," even now, more than a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union. I want to stress here the importance of the FAO foreign-language ability and discuss Vane and Fagundes' criticisms regarding the FAO assignment process.

What exactly does "enabler" mean? Merriam-Webster's on-line dictionary defines enabler as "one [who] enables another to achieve an end." Never specifically defined in Vane and Fagundes's article, the word in this context seems to mean language ability is a skill that helps FAOs do their job. This definition would be difficult to dispute. However, Vane and Fagundes say foreign-language ability is over-emphasized as a critical FAO skill, and as an "enabler," it should occupy a lower priority than skills such as knowledge of strategic issues.

Why is language ability important to a FAO? While serving overseas tours, FAOs (whether as attachés or security assistance officers) most often meet English-speaking host-country officials. However, in many host countries, members of the military do not speak English or do not

speak it well enough to function entirely in English. In such instances, it is critical for the FAO to speak the foreign language competently.

A FAO's ability to get the message across in a foreign language could affect mission success, whether in an operational environment or in support of a training exercise. In many Latin American countries, FAOs function as much in Spanish or Portuguese as they do in English. A FAO's competence in speaking a foreign language opens doors and builds relationships that might not be possible if the officer spoke only English or saw the study of foreign language merely as an "enabler." Host-country officials appreciate when foreigners, especially Americans, take time to study the host country's language. Improved rapport is the inevitable result.

Vane and Fagundes say within some regions there are too many languages to master for FAOs to communicate effectively in every country. They believe the current FAO construct views the world from a language-centric view rather than a geopolitical perspective. Perhaps there are too many languages for the FAO to fully master in Western Europe

and Northern Asia. No one can become a regional expert overnight; it takes years of studying a region and its language to attain expertise. However, having competence in even one language within a region where there are many different languages can have huge payoffs in understanding the region.

Languages such as Chinese, Russian, and Arabic are difficult to master, and students must invest significant time and effort to attain even a moderate level of ability. To become remotely competent, FAOs might spend a year or more at the Defense Language Institute, continue studying on their own and take refresher courses simply to maintain language proficiency.

Although FAOs do not need to be as proficient as translators or interpreters, they do need to focus enough effort on language study to be able to communicate effectively with host-nation military representatives. When FAOs view language capabilities as of secondary importance they relegate the study of foreign language to a lower priority and, inevitably, invest less time and effort to it than to other professional-development objectives.

During the approximate year-long in-country training phase, some FAO trainees attend host-country military schools equivalent to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or the Captain's Career Course. Attending host-nation military courses allows FAO trainees to train and work closely with host-nation officers in their own environments and to communicate with them in their own languages. Trainees learn about the host country's military culture and how its army fights, which is a critical asset when FAOs are advising policymakers or commanders. These training benefits would not be possible without extensive language training.

In my experience as a Middle East FAO (48G), language has been more than an enabler, it has been a critical tool in understanding the complicated Arab culture. Simply reading analyses of history and political science books in English, reading English news sources, or depending on English translations of Arabic texts does not allow us to understand what Arabs are saying or thinking. An over-dependence on English-transla-

tion sources risks a generalization about such a diverse culture. Reading or listening to foreign media in its original language lends a perspective translations do not always provide.

U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management* (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1 October 1998) says FAOs should "develop skills required for conducting and analyzing military activities that have economic, social, cultural, psychological, or political impact." Languages people speak shape how they think and how they view their world. FAOs cannot hope to understand foreign cultures or provide useful analyses without devoting time and effort to language study.

Vane and Fagundes have three primary criticisms of FAO assignments: assignments are skewed toward the attaché system; assignments reflect a Eurocentric Cold War mentality; and the FAO development model is outmoded. The first point is a criticism that also exists within the FAO world; repetitive attaché assignments can take FAOs out of the mainstream of the Army. It is incumbent on the FAO community to show attachés doing work critical to U.S. foreign policy, not simply "riding the cocktail circuit."

By interacting with militaries in the Middle East, the Far East, and South Asia, attachés are making critical contributions to fighting the Global War on Terrorism. And, far from being out of the mainstream, FAOs serving in embassies in security-assistance assignments are working directly for respective regional unified commanders.

Vane and Fagundes's statement that attaché assignments equate to battalion command in importance is not substantiated in any written Army policy. FAO branch analyses consistently show that promotion boards do not favor attaché assignments more than other types of FAO assignments.

The Human Resources Command (HRC) FAO Website says FAOs should rotate between overseas assignments as attachés and security-assistance officers with assignments in Washington, D.C., and major commands such as U.S. Central Command or U.S. European Command (EUCOM). FAOs should have a va-

riety of assignments to develop their regional expertise. Repetitive attaché assignments are officially discouraged.

When Vane and Fagundes criticize FAO assignments as Eurocentric, they seem to be suffering from the same Cold War mentality they themselves decry. For them to say FAO positions are "over billeted within plush assignments in European Capital cities" is inaccurate and focuses only on what is going on in a small part of the world. FAOs also serve as political military advisers to commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the FAO assignments list includes such countries as Uzbekistan, Djibouti, Cambodia, Yemen, and numerous other places besides Western European cities. The Cold War is over and FAO missions are changing.

Vane and Fagundes correctly say a large number of Eurasian FAOs (48E) serve in Germany. Three of the six 48E colonels are serving at EUCOM, which is headquartered in Germany, and six 48Es (three majors, two lieutenant colonels, and one colonel) are assigned to the Marshall Center in Garmisch, which is responsible for supervising most Eurasian FAO trainees. Given the projected number of FAO trainees at the Marshall Center (six to eight slots per year), this might be an excessive number. However, Vane and Fagundes' article implies the high number of 48E officers in EUCOM is because HRC FAO proponents or FAO career managers make unilateral determinations of structure and requirements.

Major or joint commands (in this case EUCOM) determine how many FAOs are assigned and where they will serve. Arguably, the number of 48E FAOs in Germany is larger than necessary and likely will change as Department of Defense (DOD) refocuses priorities and changes are reflected in EUCOM manning documents. (The FAO Branch Chief at the U.S. Army Human Resource Center provided information on the Marshall Center staffing and other Germany Army FAO assignments.)

Vane and Fagundes correctly call for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and theater commanders to review the number of attaché billets within Western Europe. However, when they criticize DIA priorities for

attaché assignments they include other than Army assignments, such as Navy or Air Force attachés. The criticisms might be valid, but addressing them is beyond the scope of the Army FAO assignments system. Updating manning documents to reflect changing strategic realities is a function of joint commands such as EUCOM or DIA, not Army FAO assignment officers.

I am puzzled why Vane and Fagundes would criticize the current FAO development model as incompatible with the Army policy of dual tracking. Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS)-3 was implemented 7 years ago to end the dual-tracking policy for officers. FAOs now occupy their own career fields, have their own professional development models, and compete against other FAOs for promotion. Without the promotion requirement to serve in operational branch-qualifying assignments, FAOs can serve in jobs that develop them as regional specialists.

The Army must continue to assess the FAO training program and assignments system and make adjustments as required. In the near term, DOD leaders are likely to make significant changes to the organization, training, and resourcing of the military. Army FAO programs must develop to support these changes or risk irrelevance. FAOs who serve in embassies worldwide or on high-

level staffs will continue to make great contributions to national security and will make these contributions by developing regional expertise. Developing and maintaining a foreign language capability is a primary skill, not merely an enabler.

Controversial Photo

Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Hall, U. S. Army, Retired—You published an article entitled “Toxic Leadership” in your JUL-AUG ’04 edition of *Military Review*. The article was written by a LTC George Reed. My beef is over the photo of me that appears within the article. The implication is that I am the prime example of someone with a “Toxic Leadership” style. I dispute that.

I was never contacted regarding use of my photo for any reason. I did not know the photo even existed.

The photo appears to be taken of me during CGSC, probably during the spring of 1996 Prairie Warrior.

I’ve already emailed the author of the article and requested a retraction and apology for this bit of libel. I believe you owe me the same.

Editor’s Reply

The photograph of Lieutenant Colonel Hall used in the article “Toxic Leadership” was selected from the library at *Military Review*. The final decision to use the article was mine, and the author of the article, Colonel George Reed, had nothing to with its

selection. The photograph was selected because it seemed to display the face and body language of an individual who had just received a blistering surprise phone call from someone in authority.

Most of us in the military have at one time or another been on the receiving end of what we regard as an unwarranted “dressing down,” either personally or by phone call. It certainly was not meant to imply that Lieutenant Colonel Hall was an example of someone guilty of a “toxic” leadership style. We regret any embarrassment this photograph may have caused either Lieutenant Colonel Hall or Colonel Reed. Greater care will be exercised in the future to avoid photographs that have substantial potential for needlessly causing embarrassment to the individuals in the photographs or authors of articles.

—wmd

Bio Correction

Staff Sergeant George E. Anderson III, *U.S. Army National Guard*—During the editing process of my article, “Winning the Nationbuilding War,” which appeared in the September-October 2004 *Military Review*, I attempted to clarify several times that I was not a Ph.D. but, rather, *studying* for my Ph.D. Although it was a complimentary distinction next to my name, it was not accurate. Would you be kind enough to ensure it is corrected in the Spanish version?

MR Index

Author Index

Aboul-Enein, LCDR Youssef H., USN, Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: The al-Qaeda Manifesto: REVIEW ESSAY, **83**

Bednarek, BG Mick, USA; LTC Thomas P. Odom, USA, Ret.; and Stephen Florich, Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Training Center, **51**

Blanchette, MAJ Wayne C., USAF; LTC Peter D. Woodmansee, USMC; and LTC Timothy L. Faulkner, USA, The Need to Validate Planning Assumptions, **58**

Brown, MAJ George C.L., USA, Do We Need FA30? Creating an Information Warfare Branch, **39**

Bunker, Robert J., Ph.D., and John P. Sullivan, Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom, ©AUSA, 2004, **69**

Emery, MAJ Norman, USA; MAJ Jason Werchan, USAF; and MAJ Donald G. Mowles, Jr., USAF, Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment, **32**

Erwin, Ralph M., Geospatial Intelligence: MR DIGEST, **87**

Evans, COL Gerald D., USA, Hyman Rickover: Excellence, Greatness, Heroism: ALMANAC, **85**

Faulkner, LTC Timothy L., USA; LTC Peter D. Woodmansee, USMC; and MAJ Wayne C. Blanchette, USAF, The Need to Validate Planning Assumptions, **58**

Florich Stephen; BG Mick Bednarek, USA; and LTC Thomas P. Odom, USA, Ret., Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Training Center, **51**

Friedenberg, LTC Robert E., USA, Redefining the Foreign Area Officer’s Role: A Response: LETTERS, **93**

Gebhardt, MAJ James F., USA, Ret., The Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience, **44**

Hall, LTC Michael B., USA, Ret., Controversial Photograph: LETTERS, **95**

Honoré, LTG Russell, USA, and COL Daniel L. Zajac, USA, Theater Immersion: Postmobilization Training in the First Army, **2**

Mowles, MAJ Donald G., Jr., USAF; MAJ Norman Emery, USA; and MAJ Jason Werchan, USAF, Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment, **32**

Odom, LTC Thomas P., USA, Ret.; BG Mick Bednarek, USA; and Stephen Florich,

Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Training Center, **51**

Pion-Berlin, David S., Ph.D., Political Management of the Military in Latin America, **19**

Scales, MG Robert H., USA, Ret., Urban Warfare: A Soldier's View, **9**

Schoomaker, GEN Peter J., U.S. Army Chief of Staff Professional Reading List: BOOKSHELF, **80**

Sullivan, John P., and Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom, ©AUSA, 2004, **69**

Taylor, MAJ Teresa Z., ARNG, Ret., Ph.D., Strength Maintenance: A Risk Management Approach, **63**

Werchan, MAJ Jason, USAF; MAJ Norman Emery, USA; and MAJ Donald G. Mowles, Jr., USAF, Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment, **32**

Woodmansee, LTC Peter D., USMC; LTC Timothy L. Faulkner, USA; and MAJ Wayne C. Blanchette, USAF, The Need to Validate Planning Assumptions, **58**

Zajac, COL Daniel L., USA; and LTG Russell Honoré, USA, Theater Immersion: Postmobilization Training in the First Army, **2**

Subject Index

Foreign Area Officer

Redefining the Foreign Area Officer's Role: A Response, LTC Robert E. Friedenberg, USA: LETTERS, **93**

Information Operations/The Media

Do We Need FA30? Creating an Information Warfare Branch, MAJ George C.L. Brown, USA, **39**

Intelligence

Geospatial Intelligence, Ralph M. Erwin: MR DIGEST, **87**

Joint Operations

Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Training Center, BG Mick Bednarek, USA; LTC Thomas P. Odom, USA, Ret.; and Stephen Florich, **51**

The Need to Validate Planning Assumptions, LTC Peter D. Woodmansee, USMC; LTC Timothy L. Faulkner, USA; and MAJ Wayne C. Blanchette, USAF, **58**

Latin America

Political Management of the Military in Latin America, David S. Pion-Berlin, Ph.D., **19**

Leader Development/Leadership

Strength Maintenance: A Risk Management Approach, MAJ Teresa Z. Taylor, ARNG, Ret., Ph.D., **63**

Military History

Hyman Rickover: Excellence, Greatness, Heroism, COL Gerald D. Evans, USA: ALMANAC, **85**

Professional Reading List

U.S. Army Chief of Staff GEN Peter J. Schoomaker Professional Reading List: BOOKSHELF, **80**

Terrorism/Counterterrorism

Ayman Al-Zawahiri's Knights under the Prophet's Banner: The al-Qaeda Manifesto, LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: REVIEW ESSAY, **83**

Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment, MAJ Norman Emery, USA; MAJ Jason Werchan, USAF; and MAJ Donald G. Mowles, Jr., USAF, **32**

The Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience, MAJ James F. Gebhardt, USA, Ret., **44**

Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., and John P. Sullivan, ©AUSA, 2004, **69**

Training

Theater Immersion: Postmobilization Training in the First Army, LTG Russell Honoré, USA, and COL Daniel L. Zajac, USA, **2**

Urban Warfare

Urban Warfare: A Soldier's View, MG Robert H. Scales, USA, Ret., **9**

